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COMMENTS
the fourth amendment is taking, namely, that it is part of the fourtcenth
amendment and completely binding upon the states regardless of the facts
involved or the evidence rules being employed in the case'n-:md it would
seem that only then will the Court secure the vitality of the fourth
amendment for the individual against oppressive and authoritarian be-
havior.
50 It should be noted that thcre are four basic circumstances in which this issue can
be brought before the Court. First, there is federal evidence admitted into a federal
court; second, there is state evidence admitted into a state court; third, state evidence
admitted into a federal court; and fourth, federal evidence admitted into a state court
proceeding. As noted above, all evidence illegally seized in the first two instances would
be excluded and in the third instance, would have to be excluded if brought on appeal
to the federal level. As yet, no determination as to the admittance of evidence obtained
illegally by federal officials into a state trial has been rendered by the Court. In People
v. Fiorito, 19 I11. 2d 246, 166 N.E. 2d 606 (1960), such a determination can be reached.
A petition for writ of certiorari has been filed. 29 U.S. L. WEEK 3077 (U.S. Sept. 20,
1960) (No. 320). By the Court's own words, such evidence would be excluded if the
writ is granted, for the "test is one of federal law." Since, however, this is an Illinois case
and Illinois has adopted the exclusionary rule, the Court, if they are to grant the writ,
will have to re-examine the facts of the case in order to determine if such evidence was
illegally obtained or not. It is questionable that they will grant the writ, however, since
the Illinois Supreme Court has already applied the exclusionary rule and has determined
that the evidence in question was not illegally seized.
A WIFE'S ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
DUE TO NEGLIGENCE
Whether a married woman may sue for loss of the consortium of her
husband, due to his injury by the negligent act of a third party, presents a
challenging question to the legal profession. Directly involved is the basic
feature of the Anglo-American legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis.
Also involved is the sociological concept of the law, i.e., the concept that
the law is, and reflects, the prevalent common concepts of civilized soci-
ety. It is the clash of these two doctrines which presents the challenge.
The aforegoing is not meant to give the impression, however, that the
law as to the wife's right to sue is unclear in any particular jurisdiction.
Such is not usually the case. Rather the opposite is true, and the jurisdic-
tions which have decided the point are quite definite as to what they
hold. The challenge is in reality national in scope. The movement of
American courts to a new view demanded by the times we live in, as op-
posed to clinging to well established concepts of the law-this is the chal-
lenge. Which side of the issue a lawyer might take at a particular time
would depend on whether he represented the wife or the defendant, for
neither side lacks arguments. This paper's purpose is to trace the develop-
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ment of the wife's right to sue and to thereby show the state of the law
today.
CONSORTIUM DEFINED
Essential to an understanding of whether a wife has an action for lost
consortium due to negligent injury of her spouse by the defendant, is an
understanding of what is meant by consortium. Often what a court de-
fines and designates as the elements of consortium determines whether the
wife may maintain her action.' At common law, a husband had a right to
the services and labor of his spouse and could sue for damages personal to
himself when she was injured. He could recover for the expenses of her
treatment and for his loss of her labor, services, and consortium.2 The en-
forcement of these rights led to confusion as to exactly what constitutes
the elements of consortium. This confusion is attributed to the use of
words. Pleadings at common law were redundant. Thus when seeking to
enforce the husband's right to recover for injuries to his wife, the plead-
ings alleged loss of services, conjugal affection, companionship, etc. How-
ever, no distinct functions were intended. Rather, another example of the
redundancy of common law pleadings was created.3
In Valentine v. Pollak4 consortium is defined as:
a property right growing out of the marriage relation and includes the exclusive
right to services of the spouse and these contemplate not so much the wages or
reward earned as assistance and helpfulness in the relations of conjugal life
according to their station and the exclusive right to the society, companionship,
and conjugal affection of each other.5
Recognizing that consortium has various elements, but denying that they
may be distinguished is the case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.6 Hitaffer de-
fines consortium by saying: "[A]lthough it embraces within its ambit of
meaning tite wife's material services, [it] also includes love, affection,
companionship, sexual relations, etc., all welded together into a concep-
tualistic unity. ' 7 Thus it can be seen that the meaning of consortium is
changing, and it can thereby be deduced that actions for its loss are
changing.
' For detailed analysis of definition see Holbrook, The Cbange in the Meaning of
Consortium, 22 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1923).
2 Feneff v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
3 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), citing, at 814, Lippman,
The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1930).
4 95 Conn. 556, 111 Ad. 869 (1920).
5 Id. at 561, 111 At. at 872.
6 183 F. 2d. 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
7 Id. at 814. (Emphasis added.)
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 8
At early common law, the only member of the family deemed harmed
by an unjustified disturbance of the family relationship was the-head of
the family.9 The husband had an action for injuries to his wife. Black-
stone points out:
[I]f the beating or other maltreatment be very enormous, so that thereby the
husband is deprived for any time of the company and assistance of his wife,
the law then gives him a separate remedy by an action of trespass, . . . for this
ill usage, per quod consortium amisit, in which he shall recover a satisfaction
in damages. 10
An early case illustrating this right of the husband at common law was
Guy v. Livesey. 11 Note that the husband's action was per quod consor-
tium amisit, not per quod servitum amisit, in other words for loss of con-
sortium, and not of services. At this period of the common law the wife
had no action whatsoever for any interference with the marriage, family
relations, or injury to her husband.12 The reason for this, as explained by
Blackstone, was "[T]he inferior hath no kind of property in the com-
pany, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in
those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or in-
jury."1 3
From the action in trespass, the actions for criminal conversation and
alienation of affections developed. The wife was denied such actions,
however, because she had no standing in court without her husband's
joining in the action. There are some fine distinctions between the ac-
tions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation which, in a
full analysis of the subject, would be of great significance. However, this
paper's purpose would not be aided by such an analysis in that here there
is sought merely a cursory study of the actions and their relationship to
the action by a wife for a negligent injury to her husband.
The husband's action for loss of his wife's consortium due to negli-
gence of a third party can be traced to the case of Ne'wberry v. Connecti-
cut & P. R.R.14 In Newberry a town was suing to recover damages it had
incurred because it was held liable for injuries caused by faulty roads. It
seems that when one Abel Willard and his wife were injured when their
8 For a detailed discussion of this topic see Lippman, supra note 3.
9 Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W. 2d 669 (S.D. 1959).
10 3 BICKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 140 (12th ed. 1794).
1179 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619).
12 3 Bi.ACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 143.
is Ibid. 14 25 Vt. 377 (1853).
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wagon overturned because of a hole in the road, Willard sued the town
for his own injuries and also, in a subsequent action, for loss of his wife's
services. The town was held liable in both cases and sought to recover
from the railroad, which was responsible for the faulty condition of the
road. The court found for the plaintiff, pointing out that the first action
by Willard was not a bar to his second action because they were distinct
from each other. A somewhat clear statement of the husband's right to
recover for the loss of the services and society of his wife because of a
third party's negligence appears in Skoglund v. Minneapolis St. Ry."'
There the court said:
In an action for injury to himself all he needed to show, in order to recover
nominal damages at least, was the negligence of the defendant and the conse-
quent injury to himself. But proof of the negligence and injury to the wife
would not sustain the husband's action in this case. The cause of action which
those facts alone show belongs to the wife. Those facts go to make up the
husband's cause of action but alone they are not enough. In addition to them
there must exist the fact that, by reason of the injury so caused, he has been
deprived of her society or services, or has been put to expense. Such loss is the
substance of his cause of action. 16
EFFECT OF THE MARRIED WOMEN'S ACTS
The law remained basically the same until the passage of the Married
Women's Acts by the various states. These acts presented the problem of
determining whether the wife now, as a femme sole, had an action for loss
of her husband's consortium, or whether on the other hand, as a result of
her having equal status in the eyes of the law, the husband would be de-
nied his action for loss of her consortium, resulting in neither having an
action for such loss. Most of the states extended to the wife the right to
sue for alienation of affections. 17 These states felt that the wife was the
equal of her husband and that her right to his companionship had the
same legal standing as his right to her companionship: If the husband's
right received the protection of the law, then the wife's right was en-
titled to the same protection. Maine was one state which refused to extend
the action to the wife on the ground that the action did more harm than
good. It was, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Maine, an action of
revenge rather than an action for compensation.' 8 The wife's right to
15 45 Minn. 330, 47 N.W. 1071 (1891).
16 Id. at 331, 47 N.W. at 1071.
17 E.g., Weber v. Weber, 113 Ark. 471, 169 S.W. 318 (1914); Work v. Campbell, 164
Cal. 343, 128 Pac. 943 (1913); Fort v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027 (1889); Betser v.
Betser, 186 111. 537, 58 N.E. 249 (1900); Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266, 55 Pac. 46 (1898);
Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson, 43 Neb. 269, 61 N.W. 577 (1895); Burch v. Goodson, 85
Kan. 86, 116 Pac. 216 (1911).
18 Howard v. Howard, 120 Me. 479, 115 At]. 259 (1929).
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bring an action for criminal conversation was also denied by Maine.19
However, many states did not agree with Maine, and allowed the wife to
maintain an action for criminal conversation. 20 Thus it might be con-
cluded that, for the most part, there was little if any reticence by the
states in extending these actions to the wife. Some of the states have sub-
sequently eliminated or limited these actions through the so-called Heart
Balm Acts,21 but an analysis of these statutes would serve no purpose here.
WIFE'S ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The first court to defect from the view that a wife could not sue for
loss of consortium due to her husband's negligent injury by a third party
was the Supreme Court of North Carolina. In Hipp v. E. I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co.,2 2 the court decided that the action arose from the nature
of the relationship created by marriage, as recognized by the state con-
stitution, and the laws derogating the common law as to the status of a
married woman. The court also pointed out that the wife could sue for
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. The Hipp case further
points out that the wife's action was for her personal damage which she
suffered as a direct consequence of the injury to her husband. The hold-
ing of the Hipp decision had a rather short life however; four years later
North Carolina reversed the Hipp case. In Hinnant v. Tide Water Power
Co.,23 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that neither the husband
nor the wife had an action for loss of consortium due to negligence. In
dictum the husband was held to have lost his action by the Married
Women's Act. The court then stated that the wife had no such action at
common law, and had not acquired it by statute. The wife's action was
struck down with strong language when the court said:
After diligent research, we have failed to find a single decision [apart from the
intimation in Hipp v. DuPont, . . .] which approves the wife's right to recover
damages for the loss of consortium, under the circumstances appearing in the
instant case, and to sanction such a right of recovery would be tantamount to
the recognition of a doctrine uttterly at variance with the most, enlightenedjudicial opinion prevailing in other jurisdictions.24
1" Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 Ad. 83 (1890).
20 E.g., Parker v. Newman, 200 Ala. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917); Scott v. O'Brien, 129 Ky. 1,
110 S.W. 260 (1908); Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N.E. 890 (1906); Seaver %.
Adams, 66 N.H. 142, 19 Atl. 776 (1890); Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294
(1916).
2 1 E.g., MicH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 551.301-555.311 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, ij 34-40,
41-47 (1959).
22 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
23 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
"I Id. at 128, 126 S.E. at 307.
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THE LANDMARK CASE
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. 2 5 was the next case allowing the wife to sue for
the loss of consortium caused by the negligent injury of her husband. The
husband was injured while at work and the wife brought an action for
the damages she suffered thereby. The action was allowed despite the ex-
clusiveness of remedy provision in the Longshoremen and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act,26 which pertained to the injury. Though the
holding in Hitaffer as to the exclusiveness of the remedy has been re-
versed,27 the decision remains the landmark case as to the wife's right of
recovery for loss of consortium for a negligent injury to her husband.
Hitaffer carefully analyzes the reasons used to deny the wife's action, and
finds fault with each. Judge Clark, writing the court's highly scholarly
opinion, states that one group of cases base their decisions denying the
wife recovery on the fact that in cases of lost consortium resulting from
negligence, the services element is the predominant factor for which com-
pensation is given. 28 With this as the common premise these cases con-
clude by stating that since the wife has no right as such to her husband's
services, she cannot recover for the loss of the services, but the husband
can still recover because he has always been entitled to his wife's serv-
ices;29 or they say that the Emancipation Act, by giving the wife a right
to the fruits of her own labors, has destroyed the husband's action.ao
These cases were rejected by the court because the premise that services
were the predominant factor was considered false. The court felt that the
separation of the elements of consortium was arbitrary, and was devised
to circumvent allowing the wife recovery.
The second group of cases attacked in the Hitaffer case also appears to
place principal emphasis on the element of services. They hold that the
wife has no cause of action for loss of consortium, since because the hus-
band, who has the duty of supporting his wife, recovers in his own ac-
tion for the loss of his ability to fulfill his duty, the wife thereby also re-
covers for the value of her lost consortium. Thus, these cases hold, any
25 183 F. 2d. 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
26 33 U.S.C.A. § 905 (Supp. 1959).
27 Aubrey v. United States, 254 F. 2d. 768 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
28 E.g., Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582 (1911).
29 Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Brown v. Kistleman,
177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Stout v. Kansas City Term Ry. Co., 172 Mo.App. 113,
157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
30 Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atd. 582 (1911); Bolger v. Boston Elevated
R.R., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236 N.W.
222 (1931); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.F. 2d. 611 (1945).
COMMENTS
other result would create double recovery. The husband, however, is al-
lowed his action because the wife has no duty to support him, and if he
had no action he could not recover his loss caused by the injury to his
wife.31 As it did with the first group, the Hitaffer court rejected these
cases on the ground that the emphasis on the element of service was im-
proper. This is an appropriate time to recall the earlier remark in this pa-
per that the original actions in this field were actions per quod consortiunm
amisit rather than per quod servituin amisit, because such an observation
seems to support the thinking in Hitaffer. The danger of double recovery
is rejected by the court on the ground that if the compensation the hus-
band receives in his action is taken into account in awarding the wife's
damages, the possibility of double recovery is eliminated.
The third group of cases criticized in Hitaffer recognized that the sen-
timental elements of consortium are also damaged by negligent torts, but
in order to deny the wife's action these courts reasoned in one of four
ways: (1) In negligence cases recovery is to compensate for the direct
consequences of the act and the injury to the wife is indirect;32 (2) the
wife's injuries are too remote and consequential to be capable of meas-
ure;3 3 (3) at common law there was no action for the sentimental ele-
ments of consortium, and the wife has not been given any new action by
statute;34 and (4) no cause of action for lost consortium was ever al-
lowed without some showing of loss of services, and the wife cannot
show such a loss.35 The court expressed doubt as to the logic in these
cases. The theory that the injury to the wife was too indirect was sum-
marily dismissed by observing that the same is true in the husband's ac-
tion, but his action is allowed. The cases holding the wife's injury too
remote were rejected because the jurisdiction was committed to the rule
that unless there was an intervening cause, any injury, which but for the
negligence would not have occurred, was actionable. As in dismissing
31 Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 SAN'. 462 (1918); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195
Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72
P. 2d 1100 (1937).
2 Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692,98 N.E. 631 (1912); Feneff v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.,
84 Conn. 9, 78 Ad. 582 (1911); Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y.S. 459 (1900);
Howard v. Verdigris Val. Elec. Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P. 2d 784 (1949); Kosciolek
v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517, 160 Pac. 132 (1916); McDade v. West,
80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E. 2d. 299 (1949).
33 Feneff v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911); Stout v. Kansas City
Term. Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
34 Feneff v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R., supra. note 33; Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry.,
supra note 33.
35 Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Feneff v. Cent. &
H.R.R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582 (1911).
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the cases holding that injury to the wife was indirect, the court pointed
out that if the wife could not bring her action because her injury was too
remote, the husband should be denied his action on the same basis. Deny-
ing the action because the common law did not recognize the sentimental
elements of consortium, or because some loss of services had to be shown
and the wife could not show any, were rejected because these theories
lacked precedent: Husbands had been allowed to sue for criminal con-
versation where there was no loss of services and the only bases of recov-
ery were the sentimental elements of consortium.
The last theory used to deny the wife's right to sue which was attacked
by Hitaffer was the theory that the wife had no property interest in the
marriage, and her interest was not derived from a contract of bargain and
sale. Therefore, these courts held that the law will not enter such cases
except in instances of necessity.36 This reasoning was rejected because of
the District of Columbia was committed to a different rule, namely, that
marriage creates equal and mutual rights and obligations for the husband
and wife.
Hitaffer did not meet an early demise as did the Hipp case. In fact, the
Hitaffer decision became the cornerstone of a new movement in the law.
At first it was not readily accepted, but once it did receive acceptance, its
doctrine gained momentum. Various jurisdictions have granted the wife
an action for loss of consortium due to negligence resulting in an injury
to her husband.87
CONCLUSION
Allowing the wife to recover for her loss of consortium caused by the
defendant's negligent injury of the husband is a reflection of modern
American civilization. It solves the anomaly created by making the wife
the legal equal of her spouse, but denying her the right to bring a cause
of action which he, her legal equal, can bring. Denying the action to both
spouses also solves the anomaly, and also avoids multiplicity of actions,
but it creates the danger that a wrong may be committed for which there
is no remedy providing the full compensation to which the family is en-
titled. The trend started by the Hitaffer case fulfills the obligations of the
law to provide remedies for wrongs and to adjust to the needs of society.
36 Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc.
336, 63 N.Y.S. 459 (1900).
3 Dini v. Naiditch, Nos. 35466 & 35721, Sept. 30, 1960; Montgomery v. Stephan, 359
Mich. 33, 101 NAV. 2d. 227 (1960); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W. 2d. 669 (S.D. 1959);
Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 111 SE. 2d. 106 (1959); Luther v. Maple, 250 F. 2d.
916 (8th Cir. 1958); Missouri Pacific Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W. 2d.
41 (1957); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W. 2d. 480 (1956).
